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Abstract--This work presents a methodology for forward 
electricity contract price projection based on market equilibrium 
and social welfare optimization. In the methodology supply and 
demand for forward contracts are produced in such a way that 
each agent (generator/load/trader) optimizes a risk adjusted 
expected value of its revenue/cost. When uncertainties are 
represented by a discrete number of scenarios, a key result in the 
paper is that contract price corresponds to the dual variable of 
the equilibrium constraints in the linear programming problem 
associated to the optimization of total agents´ welfare. Besides 
computing an equilibrium contract price for a given year, the 
methodology can also be used to compute the evolution of the 
probability distribution associated to a contract price with a 
future delivery period; this an import issue in quantifying 
forward contract risks. Examples of the methodology application 
are presented and discussed. 
 
Index Terms—Electricity spot market, forward contracts, 
market equilibrium, social welfare. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Electricity markets presents a great level risk due to spot 
prices uncertainty and volatility. 
Volatility in electricity spot prices occurs in the short, 
medium and long-term and affects the cash flow of market 
agents who sell/buy energy in the wholesale market.  
Short-term volatility is basically due to equipment 
(generators and transmission) failure, fuel availability, 
uncertainties in renewable energy production, fuel price and 
daily temperature. In medium and long-term periods, volatility 
in spot prices is due to uncertainty in hydrological conditions 
(in system with large reservoirs), demand growth, structural 
changes in the electricity generation sector and so on. 
Figure 1 shows the hourly spot price on a randomly selected 
day in the PECO zone of the PJM power market [1]. PJM is a 
predominantly thermal system [2] and, as a result, spot prices 
vary widely along the day.  
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Figure 1 - Hourly Spot Prices - PJM 
 
Figure 2 shows the average daily spot price, from 2007 to 
2014, for the same system. Notice that, except for some 
spikes, prices show a quite stable behavior throughout the 
years. 
 
Figure 2 - Average Daily Spot Prices 
 
Now consider a predominantly hydro system with large 
reservoirs, such as Brazil [3]. Spot prices in Brazil [4] are 
strongly correlated to the amount of water stored in the main 
hydro plant´s reservoirs, as shown in Figure 3. Notice how 
short-term price volatility is small, but medium to long-term 
volatility is huge. 
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Weight 𝜆௚, 𝜆ௗ is a risk aversion parameter for the generator 
and load.  
For a given contract price 𝑝, generators sell contract amount 
associated to 𝑝, given by: 
𝑞௦(𝑝) = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥௤ೞ൛𝑅𝑔𝐴𝑑𝑗(𝑞𝑠, 𝑝)ൟ            (5) 
Likewise, for given a contract price 𝑝 loads buy contract 
amount associated to 𝑝, given by  
𝑞௕(𝑝) = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥௤್൛𝑅𝑑𝐴𝑑𝑗(𝑞𝑏, 𝑝)ൟ          (6) 
Competitive equilibrium in the contract market 
corresponding to a pair (𝑝଴, 𝑞଴) of price and energy amount 
such that 𝑞଴ is the solution of both supply (4) and demand 
curve (5) associated to price 𝑝଴: 
𝑞଴ = 𝑞௦(𝑝଴) = 𝑞௕(𝑝଴)              (7) 
In equation (7) 𝑝଴ is the future/forward equilibrium contract 
price, reflecting agent expectations about market conditions in 
the contract delivery date. 
When uncertainties are represented by a discrete number of 
scenarios, using Rockafellar´s representation of 𝐶𝑉𝑎𝑅 [8], 
implies that problems (5)-(6) correspond to linear 
programming problems, parametrized by the price 𝑝. For a fix 
price 𝑝 the optimality conditions for problems (5) and (6) 
corresponds to a linear system of equality/inequality 
equations. However, when 𝑝 is considered as a variable the 
resulting system of equality/inequality equations become 
nonlinear due to products involving contract price and energy 
amount. This means that in principle computation of the 
competitive equilibrium price in the contract market requires 
solving a system of nonlinear equality/inequality equations. In 
the next section we will show that this equilibrium can be 
found through the resolution of a linear programing problem 
which corresponds to the welfare maximization of both 
agents. 
III.    EQUILIBRIUM PRICE COMPUTATION IN THE CONTRACT 
MARKET AND WELFARE MAXIMIZATION 
 
We start this section by observing that as the terms 𝑞௦ × 𝑝 
and 𝑞௕ × 𝑝 in revenues equations for generators and loads are 
not random, expected value and 𝐶𝑉𝑎𝑅 properties [9], imply that: 
𝑅௚஺ௗ௝(𝑞௦, 𝑝) = 𝜆௚𝐸ൣ൫𝑔ෝ − 𝑞𝑠൯ × 𝜋ෝ൧ + ൫1 − 𝜆௚൯𝐶𝑉𝑎𝑅ఈൣ൫𝑔ෝ − 𝑞𝑠൯ × 𝜋ෝ൧
+ 𝑞𝑠 × 𝑝 
                      (8) 
𝑅ௗ஺ௗ௝(𝑞௕, 𝑝) = 𝜆ௗ𝐸 ቂቀ𝑞𝑏 − 𝑑෡ቁ × 𝜋ෝቃ + (1 − 𝜆ௗ)𝐶𝑉𝑎𝑅ఈ ቂቀ𝑞𝑏 − 𝑑෡ቁ × 𝜋ෝቃ
− 𝑞𝑏 × 𝑝 
                        (9) 
Note that in (8) 𝑞௦ × 𝑝 is equal to the revenue associated to 
contract selling. The other term corresponds to the negative of 
the costs in the spot market associated to contract energy 
delivering. Thus (8) corresponds to the seller´s surplus. On the 
other hand, (9) corresponds to contract revenue in the spot 
market subtracted by the cost of purchasing it (𝑞௕ × 𝑝) which 
is equal to the buyer´s surplus. 
Supposing that uncertainties are represents by a discrete 
number of scenarios, Rockafellar´s representation of CVaR [8] 
and (8) imply that problem (5) can be written as: 
𝑀𝑎𝑥௤ೞ ቄ𝜆𝑔
∑ 𝑅𝑔,𝑘𝑘
𝐾 + ൫1 − 𝜆𝑔൯ ቂ𝑎𝑔 +
∑ [𝑅𝑔,𝑘−𝑎𝑔]−𝑘
𝐾×(1−𝛼) ቃ + 𝑞௦ × 𝑝ቅ  (10)
      
s.t. 
 𝑅௚,௞ − ൫𝑔𝑘 − 𝑞𝑠൯ × 𝜋𝑘 = 0, 𝑘 = 1, … , 𝐾 
 𝑞௦ ≥ 0 
      
Where: 
𝐾 number of scenarios 
𝜋௞ Spot price in scenario 𝑘 
𝑔௞ Generation in scenario𝑘  
𝑅௚,௞ net revenue of generator in the spot market in 
scenario 𝑘 
[𝑥]ି equals to 𝑥 if 𝑥 ≤ 0 and 0 if 𝑥 > 0  
Problem (8) is nonlinear. Performing a transformation, it 
can be rewritten as a linear programming problem:  
𝑀𝑎𝑥௤ೞ ቄ𝜆𝑔
∑ 𝑅𝑔,𝑘𝑘
𝐾 + ൫1 − 𝜆𝑔൯ ቂ𝑎𝑔 +
∑ 𝑦𝑔,𝑘𝑘
𝐾×(1−𝛼)ቃ + 𝑞௦ × 𝑝ቅ   (11) 
s.t.               Dual variables: 
 𝑅௚,௞ − ൫𝑔𝑘 − 𝑞𝑠൯ × 𝜋𝑘 = 0, 𝑘 = 1, … , 𝐾     𝜃௚,௞ 
 𝑞௦ ≥ 0                 𝛽௚ 
𝑦௚,௞ ≤ 0, 𝑘 = 1, … , 𝐾             𝛾௚,௞ 
𝑦௚,௞ ≤ 𝑅௚,௞ − 𝑎௚, 𝑘 = 1, … , 𝐾        𝜂௚,௞ 
 
Likewise, problem (6) with transformation above can be 
written as: 
𝑀𝑎𝑥௤್ ቄ𝜆𝑑
∑ 𝑅𝑑,𝑘𝑘
𝐾 + (1 − 𝜆𝑑) ቂ𝑎𝑑 +
∑ 𝑦𝑑,𝑘𝑘
𝐾×(1−𝛼)ቃ − 𝑞௕ × 𝑝ቅ   (12) 
s.t.               Dual variables: 
 𝑅ௗ,௞ − ൫𝑞𝑏 − 𝑑𝑘൯ × 𝜋𝑘 = 0, 𝑘 = 1, … , 𝐾    𝜃ௗ,௞ 
 𝑞௕ ≥ 0                 𝛽ௗ 
𝑦ௗ,௞ ≤ 0, 𝑘 = 1, … , 𝐾             𝛾ௗ,௞ 
𝑦ௗ,௞ ≤ 𝑅ௗ,௞ − 𝑎ௗ, 𝑘 = 1, … , 𝐾        𝜂ௗ,௞ 
Where: 
𝑑௞ Load in scenario 𝑘  
𝑅ௗ,௞ net revenue of load in the spot market in scenario 𝑘 
Now suppose that there is a price 𝑝଴ which corresponds to 
equilibrium, that is:       
𝑞଴ = 𝑞௦(𝑝଴) = 𝑞௕(𝑝଴)  
Optimality conditions for problems (11) at 𝑞଴, with price 
𝑝଴, can be written as: 
𝑅௚,௞଴ + 𝑞0 × 𝜋𝑘 = 𝜋𝑘 × 𝑔𝑘, 𝑘 = 1, … , 𝐾        (13) 
 𝑞଴ ≥ 0                    (14) 
𝑦௚,௞଴ ≤ 0, 𝑘 = 1, … , 𝐾               (15) 
𝑦௚,௞଴ − 𝑅𝑔,𝑘0 + 𝑎௚଴ ≤ 0, 𝑘 = 1, … , 𝐾          (16) 
𝜆𝑔
௄ − 𝜃௚,௞଴ + 𝜂௚,௞଴ = 0, 𝑘 = 1, … , 𝐾          (17) 
൫1 − 𝜆𝑔൯ − ∑ 𝜂௚,௞଴௞ = 0               (18) 
(ଵିఒ೒)
௄×(ଵିఈ) − 𝛾௚,௞଴ − 𝜂௚,௞଴ = 0, 𝑘 = 1, … , 𝐾         (19) 
𝑝଴ − ∑ 𝜋௞ × 𝜃௚,௞଴௞ − 𝛽௚଴ = 0           (20) 
𝛽௚଴ ≤ 0                    (21) 
𝛾௚,௞଴ ≥ 0, 𝑘 = 1, … , 𝐾                (22) 
𝜂௚,௞଴ ≥ 0, 𝑘 = 1, … , 𝐾               (23) 
∑ 𝜃௚,௞଴ × 𝜋௞ × 𝑔௞௞ = 𝜆𝑔 ∑ 𝑅𝑔,𝑘
0𝑘
𝐾 + ൫1 − 𝜆𝑔൯ ൤𝑎𝑔0 +
∑ ௬೒,ೖబ𝑘
𝐾×(1−𝛼)൨ +
+ 𝑞଴ × 𝑝଴                  (24) 
 Equality (2
condition. 
Optimality 
𝑝଴, can be wri
𝑅ௗ,௞଴ − 𝑞0 × 𝜋𝑘
 𝑞଴ ≥ 0    
𝑦ௗ,௞଴ ≤ 0, 𝑘 =
𝑦ௗ,௞଴ − 𝑅ௗ,௞଴ +
ఒ೏
௄ − 𝜃ௗ,௞଴ + 𝜂ௗ଴
(1 − 𝜆ௗ) − ∑௞
(ଵିఒ೏)
௄×(ଵିఈ) − 𝛾ௗ,௞଴
−𝑝଴ + ∑ 𝜋௞௞
𝛽ௗ଴ ≤ 0    
𝛾ௗ,௞଴ ≥ 0, 𝑘 =
𝜂ௗ,௞଴ ≥ 0, 𝑘 =
− ∑ 𝜃ௗ,௞଴ × 𝜋௞
𝑞଴ × 𝑝଴    
Equality (3
condition. 
Now consid
 
𝑀𝑎𝑥௤ೞ,௤್ ቄ𝜆𝑔
∑
(1 − 𝜆𝑑) ቂ𝑎𝑑 +
s.t.     
 𝑅௚,௞ − ൫𝑔𝑘 − 𝑞
 𝑞௦ ≥ 0    
𝑦௚,௞ ≤ 0, 𝑘 =
𝑦௚,௞ ≤ 𝑅௚,௞ −
𝑅ௗ,௞ − ൫𝑞𝑏 − 𝑑
 𝑞௕ ≥ 0    
𝑦ௗ,௞ ≤ 0, 𝑘 =
𝑦ௗ,௞ ≤ 𝑅ௗ,௞ −
𝑞௦ − 𝑞௕ = 0  
Optimality 
𝑅௚,௞ + 𝑞𝑠 × 𝜋𝑘
 𝑞௦ ≥ 0    
𝑦௚,௞ ≤ 0, 𝑘 =
𝑦௚,௞ − 𝑅௚,௞ +
𝑅ௗ,௞ − 𝑞𝑏 × 𝜋𝑘
 𝑞௕ ≥ 0    
𝑦ௗ,௞ ≤ 0, 𝑘 =
𝑦ௗ,௞ − 𝑅ௗ,௞ +
𝑞௦ − 𝑞௕ = 0  
ఒ೒
௄ − 𝜃௚,௞ + 𝜂௚
൫1 − 𝜆௚൯ − ∑௞
(ଵିఒ೒)
௄×(ଵିఈ) − 𝛾௚,௞
−𝛿௚,ௗ − ∑ 𝜋௞௞
𝛽௚ ≤ 0    
𝛾௚,௞ ≥ 0, 𝑘 =
4) correspond
conditions for 
tten as: 
= −𝜋𝑘 × 𝑑𝑘, 𝑘
      
1, … , 𝐾     
𝑎ௗ଴ ≤ 0, 𝑘 = 1
,௞ = 0, 𝑘 = 1,
𝜂ௗ,௞଴ = 0    
− 𝜂ௗ,௞଴ = 0, 𝑘
× 𝜃ௗ,௞଴ − 𝛽ௗ଴ =
      
1, … , 𝐾     
1, … , 𝐾     
௞ × 𝑑௞ = 𝜆𝑑 ∑𝑘
      
6) correspond
er the followin
𝑅𝑔,𝑘𝑘
𝐾 + ൫1 − 𝜆𝑔
∑ 𝑦𝑑,𝑘𝑘
𝐾×(1−𝛼)ቃቅ    
      
𝑠൯ × 𝜋𝑘 = 0, 𝑘
      
1, … , 𝐾     
𝑎௚, 𝑘 = 1, … , 𝐾
𝑘൯ × 𝜋𝑘 = 0, 𝑘
      
1, … , 𝐾     
𝑎ௗ, 𝑘 = 1, … ,
      
conditions asso
= 𝜋𝑘 × 𝑔𝑘, 𝑘 =
      
1, … , 𝐾     
𝑎௚ ≤ 0, 𝑘 = 1
= −𝜋𝑘 × 𝑑𝑘, 𝑘
      
1, … , 𝐾     
𝑎ௗ ≤ 0, 𝑘 = 1
      
,௞ = 0, 𝑘 = 1,
𝜂௚,௞ = 0    
− 𝜂௚,௞ = 0, 𝑘
× 𝜃௚,௞ − 𝛽௚ =
      
1, … , 𝐾     
s to the prim
problems (12)
= 1, … , 𝐾   
     
     
, … , 𝐾     
… , 𝐾     
     
= 1, … , 𝐾   
0     
     
     
     
𝑅𝑑,𝑘0
𝐾 + (1 − 𝜆𝑑)
     
s to the prim
g linear optim
൯ ቂ𝑎𝑔 + ∑ [𝑅𝑔,𝑘−𝑘𝐾×(1−
     
    Du
= 1, … , 𝐾   
     
      
      
= 1, … , 𝐾  
     
      
𝐾      
     
ciated to prob
1, … , 𝐾   
     
      
, … , 𝐾     
= 1, … , 𝐾  
     
      
, … , 𝐾     
     
… , 𝐾     
     
= 1, … , 𝐾   
0      
     
     
al-dual equa
 at 𝑞଴, with pr
     (
     (
     (
     (
     (
     (
     (
      (
     (
     (
     (
൤𝑎𝑑0 + ∑ ௬೏,ೖ
బ𝑘
𝐾×(1−𝛼)൨
     (3
al-dual equa
ization proble
𝑎𝑔]−
𝛼) ቃ + 𝜆𝑑
∑ 𝑅𝑑,𝑘𝑘
𝐾
    (37)
al variables:
  𝜃௚,௞ 
  𝛽௚ 
  𝛾௚,௞ 
  𝜂௚,௞ 
  𝜃ௗ,௞ 
  𝛽ௗ 
  𝛾ௗ,௞ 
  𝜂ௗ,௞ 
  𝛿௚,ௗ 
lem (37) are:
   (38) 
   (39) 
   (40) 
   (41) 
   (42) 
   (43) 
   (44) 
   (45) 
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